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Abstract 
This paper serves to discuss religion and argues for the existence of the 
supernatural/transcendental. The argument stems from an overwhelming amount of 
evidence - in the form of religious practice and thought - from congeries of 
communities and cultures, across a vast span of time (arguably all of human history), 
the world over. Each community has grappled with the transcendental, something 
beyond this world hic et nunc. 
I will begin by defining religion - the lens through which we shall perceive who or 
what we understand to be God, or the "spiritual". I will then explore various thoughts 
that have been espoused at certain junctures in human history both in religion and 
some of the philosophical thought that has commented on God and religion. 
The Zulu Mvelinqangi; the Judeo-Christian God known by the ineffable 
tetragrammaton [YHVH]; the Muslim Allah; the deities of the Egyptians, Greco-
Romans, Hindus and Babylonians to name a few. Karen Armstrong (1999:116) – in 
her A History of God – aptly points out that men have always speculated about an 
Absolute. They play language-games and not one of their explanations suffices; the 
study of religion, it can be argued, is as old as human thought (Jastrow 1901:1). In 
fact religious thought and practices have been present in almost every human 
culture (Murray & Rea 2008:x). Be it trees, animals, the sun or some transcendent 
being, humans have pondered about the supernatural for millennia. This then begs 
the question: “what is religion?” 
A neat and compact denotation of the word religion is elusive; its object is vast and 
greatly disparate, so much so that any concise definition would inadvertently exclude 
a particular religion. To further compound this difficulty, specific religions (like the 
cultures in which they are situated) are in continual flux. This is to say that any 
definition proffered would possibly become obsolete at a later stage in human 
history. A simple example would be if you succinctly defined religion as a belief in a 
Higher Power, a Supreme Being. As a Christian it would be easy for me to fall into 
what Clack & Cack (2008:1) call the “Parson Thwackum Error”, in defining religion by 
means of my particular religion or one dominant in my culture. I would be confronted 
with resistance from Buddhist scholars, a belief system that neither denies the 
existence of deities nor subscribes to or believes  in them. 
The difficulty experienced in denoting the word religion has led to a congeries of 
connotations cropping up, to the extent that Wilfred Cantwell Smith would rather 
discard the term altogether. In his The Meaning and End of Religion, Smith 
(1991:194) proposes this due to religion’s ambiguity and illegitimate traditional 
meanings [connotations]. His allegations can easily be illustrated by the societal 
reactions to the word religion: what comes to mind is the on-going crisis with ISIS 
(Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), the 9/11 attacks or even the Colonisation of Africa 
narrated vividly in the late Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart. Closer to home, one 
may think of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa buttressing apartheid with 
religion. A malpractice of religion, however, cannot justify throwing the baby out with 
the bathwater. Let us explore the term religion and attempt to define it, with the 
cognisance of the transience of any definition put forth. 
Morris Jastrow (1901:1) said that in a sense, the study of religion 
[Religionswissenschaft] is as old as human thought yet in another more apposite 
sense, is the youngest of the sciences. Peter Harrison (1990:14) states that 
Religionswissenschaft “defined its object and explicated it”; it was in accordance with 
the development of the science that religion emerged as a natural object and one 
that could be studied. Prior to that, religion was something people merely practised. 
Armstrong (1999:112) articulates that it was simply a matter of “cult and ritual” as 
opposed to ideas; it was not philosophical or theological. Religion was emotive and 
not cognitive, something practised not pondered. 
Justin L. Barrett makes this distinction clear in his essay: The Naturalness of 
Religion and the Unnaturalness of Theology. As one can extrapolate from the title, 
Barrett argues for the naturalness of religion. He describes religion as “a shared 
body of ideas and practices related to the presumed existence of counterintuitive 
intentional agents” (Barrett 2012:4). Barrett (2012:11) likens religion to language, 
both being forms of cultural expression natural to human systems of cognition; he 
cites the ease with which people engage in religious thought. People need little 
instruction and religious beliefs are generally acquired so early in life that most 
seldom remember not having them; archaeologically, evidence of ritual burial sites 
imply that religion has been in our midst for north of thirty thousand years (Barrett 
2012:11-12). We can summate that religion is natural and something people have 
been engaged in for millennia, however, let us continue exploring the term in order to 
explicate it further. 
When we consult the literature in this discourse, we find a dichotomy of approaches 
to the issue of defining religion: the substantive and the functional (Clack & Clack 
2008:2; Thompson 2007:ix). The substantive definition defines religion according to 
the “objects of faith” or “(theistic) belief content”; Melford E. Spiro states that religion 
is “an institution consisting of culturally patterned interaction with culturally postulated 
superhuman beings” (Clack & Clack 2008:2; Thompson 2007:ix). This definition is 
compatible with the three great monotheistic faiths but runs into trouble when 
confronted by Buddhism or certain sects of Jainism that do not believe in gods and 
powerful spirits or supernatural entities like angels and jinn; such a narrow definition 
would inadvertently exclude such belief systems (Clack & Clack 2008:2-3; 
Thompson 2007:ix). 
The functionalist approach in contrast, does not focus on belief content but rather the 
role religion plays in a person’s life (Thompson 2007:ix). Clack & Clack (2008:3) 
posit that the word religion is derived from the Latin religare meaning “to bind”. The 
functionalist  definition rings truer to the etymology of religion in that it investigates 
how religion binds together members of a community into a coherent whole, the 
values and morality that spring from it and how it contributes to their 
Weltanschauungen (Clack & Clack 2008:3; Thompson 2007:ix). I would argue that 
this is the sort of definition Karl Marx had in mind when he called religion the “opium 
of the people”. 
With the aid of Clack & Clack’s (2008:6) definition, I will now conflate the various 
descriptions we have covered and proffer a denotation of religion as: 
A cultural phenomenon, natural to humans, that is primarily practised by individuals 
within a community. It consists of a shared set of concepts and creeds. It normally 
presumes and lays claim to contact with supernatural entities or in the very least, 
acknowledges transcendence. It provides a Weltanschauung to its adherents, and 
offers a meaning to life along with goals to be attained. It can have either substantive 
or functional qualities or both. It is generally but not prescriptively manifested in an 
institutional form with organised rituals, a priesthood and areas or structures 
dedicated to ceremonial activity. 
Now that we have framed what religion is, we will use it as a lens through which we 
will focus and also capture what it portrays to us. We will first explore a few instances 
of religion. Through the ages, the idea of God has evolved and adapted to the needs 
of those practising religion. God was initially viewed as a majestic yet distant Sky 
God which begged the need for more relatable gods and spirits (Armstrong 1999:9); 
this is instantiated by the veneration of ancestors practised in African traditional 
religion, as well the anthropomorphic conceptions of Greek deities. Natural 
phenomena necessitated some measure of understanding and these forces were 
consequently personalised and made into gods as a means of explanation 
(Armstrong 1999:11). This is seen with Thor being the reason behind thunder, Zeus 
depicted as wielding lightning bolts, and the sun’s traverse across the sky 
personified by a chariot driven by the Greek god Helios. 
The sort of thought evinced here reminds me of izinganekwane [Zulu folklore] that 
my grandmothers used to tell to me. One that springs to mind features a dog and a 
cab driver. In short, the dog travelled with a cab driver and paid with a large 
denomination banknote, thereafter asking for his change upon arriving at the 
destination. The cab driver promptly sped off with the money and this story serves to 
explain why dogs chase after cars. This may be a ludicrous example but in light of 
these conceptions of God, we learn a lot more about ourselves and the thought we 
evince, as well as our needs in a given moment. Whether we seek an explanation for 
the world around us or the means to live in it – for instance, agrarian communities 
were inclined to worship a female fertility goddess whereas warrior groups tended 
towards a male god of war. 
In antiquity, God was self-evident and pragmatic; people believed in Him because 
He worked for them. God was not a theological or philosophical abstraction; people 
did not sit in ivory towers cogitating proofs for His scientific and philosophical 
soundness (Armstrong 1999:25). The way in which we approach God today is the 
heritage of the Aufklärung – one that has overtones of positivism and C.S. Lewis’ 
“chronological snobbery”. Friedrich Nietzsche (1874:83) speaks of an age which 
imagines that it “possesses the rarest of virtues, justice, to a greater degree than any 
other age”, an age that boastfully insinuates progress. Jean-Paul Sartre (1946:306) 
would be just as opposed to this – as Nietzsche was before him – stating that he, in 
a sense, does not believe in progress because it implies amelioration. It is 
chronological snobbery to assume that we are better off than any given society at 
any point in history, when the Weltanschauungen and Zeitgeist were different to that 
of ours. To look back from the imagined vantage point of a predominantly post-
Aufklärung, Western mind-set and pass judgment on a different paradigm is 
irresponsible and inconclusive. Who are we to say we are better off and what exactly 
is the standard of measure? I would like to relate a story to stimulate thought on this 
point. 
The story begins with a United States government official enquiring about a Native 
American chief’s observations of colonialists’ actions over a span of almost a century 
– the wars, technological advances, the “progress” and the damage. To this, the 
chief nodded in acknowledgment and the official continued to ask the chief’s opinion 
on where the colonialists had gone wrong. The chief’s response related all the 
positive aspects of their community – no taxes, no debt, an abundance of food, clean 
water, free medical service – and almost derisively, he states that only the 
colonialists were vacuous enough to presume they could improve such a system. 
Any system, however, has its drawbacks and although there is truth in the chief’s 
words, it is also true that there was a lot of infighting amongst the Native American 
tribes; it becomes difficult to gauge “progress”. 
It is easy to look back and label the civilisations observed as premodern, people who 
were uncritical of their beliefs. To them, God was pragmatic and met immediate 
needs, only later did man assume they could scrutinise Him under a microscope and 
conceive definitions for an infinite God using their finite minds. The finitude of the 
human mind led to a natural conclusion, that the idea of God contained in Western 
thought would meet its demise. Before we explore this idea, let us focus in on some 
instances of religion and the thought and practices thereof. 
According to certain scholars and critics, the covenant made at Mount Sinai (circa 
1200 BCE) between God and the Israelites only became important to them in the 
seventh century BCE (Armstrong 1999:32). The covenant, scholars argue, paints a 
picture of a polytheistic setting where Yahweh was preeminent; Israelites and much 
of the Middle East were not yet monotheistic (Armstrong 1999:32). The problem for 
me lies in the fact that the very Tanach that the scholars consult in making their 
claims calls “other gods” demons (see Dt 32:17); nothing more than evil spirits, 
shedim in Hebrew or daimonia in Greek. These beings are elevated to godhood 
through idolatry and the Bible states that they are created beings worshipped as 
gods that can do nothing (see Jr 10:3-5, 8-11; Rm 1:23; 1 Cor 8:4-5). The Israelites 
and their contemporaries may have held to a limited polytheistic view but one should 
question its validity. 
Four centuries prior to the covenant at Mount Sinai, in the seventeenth century BCE, 
Aryans (a people from what is now Iran) invaded, subdued and imposed their 
religious ideas upon the natives of the Indus valley (Armstrong 1999:38). In the Rig-
Veda (a collection of odes), we encounter a pantheon of gods that resemble those of 
the Middle East. There are also traces of human thought that all these gods were 
derived from one Absolute that transcended them all (Armstrong 1999:38). Unlike 
some faith practices in antiquity (e.g. Babylonian and Egyptian), the Vedic religion 
did not seek to explain the origins of life but consisted of a more existential 
approach. 
In the subsequent centuries following the Aryan invasion, the religious ideas of the 
suppressed indigenous people resurfaced and an interest in karma resurged 
(Armstrong 1999:39). In light of that, since one’s destiny was a direct result of their 
actions, people were reluctant to blame gods for human behaviour and the 
consequences thereof (Armstrong 1999:39). Vedic religion was preoccupied with 
ritual sacrifice but the Indian practices of old renewed interest in yoga and the 
external focus of the Vedic religion felt empty as people sought inner meaning; the 
Indian practices were more internal and personal as opposed to the rigid Vedic 
liturgy and rituals (Armstrong 1999:39). 
In the wake of Hinduism and Buddhism, the gods lost status in India. Hindus and 
Buddhists did not deny the existence of the gods but strove to conceive new means 
to surpass and transcend them, to take charge of one’s own destiny (Armstrong 
1999:39). Buddhists do not attribute religious experience to contact with a 
supernatural being; they believe that it is natural to man (Armstrong 1999:9, 43). 
Conversely, in Vedic religion people experienced a holy power (Brahman) through 
sacrificial rituals. Brahman came to be understood as a power which sustains the 
universe; some saw it as personal whilst others viewed it as an impersonal force. 
Brahman is in fact neutral, permeates all life and cannot be addressed (Armstrong 
1999:40). 
Much like the people native to India had grown to be dissatisfied with the Vedic 
religion, so too did the Greeks grow tired of the myths of religion used to explain 
reality (Armstrong 1999:46). Richard Tarnas (1996:24) – in his The Passion of the 
Western Mind – states that the Hellenic mind had moved in a general direction away 
from “the supernatural and toward the natural”. The Greek civilisation is generally 
agreed upon (case in point being Armstrong and Tarnas) as the birthplace of 
Western philosophy with Plato (427-346 BCE) receiving primacy. In pagan antiquity, 
it was believed that an archetypal world existed that corresponded to our own, a 
notion that Plato translated into his conception of the world of the Forms or Ideas 
(Armstrong 1999:43; Tarnas 1996:6). Since it was believed that nothing in this world 
hic et nunc had any lasting significance and everything was in meaningless flux, then 
a stable, universal, timeless and perfect world was superior to and stood beyond the 
concrete world, forming it (Armstrong 1999:43; Tarnas 1996:6). 
Aristotle (384-322 BCE) was heavily influenced by Plato but opposed his conception 
of transcendent, pre-existent and self-subsistent Forms, opting rather to describe 
them in a more immanent sense of being inherent in material objects (Armstrong 
1999:49; Tarnas 1996:66). The only exception was Aristotle’s supreme Form 
described as “an already existing actuality, absolute in its perfection, the only form 
existing entirely separate from matter” – the Unmoved Mover, the “first cause of the 
universe”, God (Armstrong 1999:50; Tarnas 1996:63). The ideas of Plato and 
Aristotle would later serve to buttress the monotheists’ articulation of God although 
Jewish and Muslim admirers would have to concede that these concepts were 
“logical [necessities] rather that religious conviction[s]” and could have no impact on 
the lives of ordinary mortals (Armstrong 1999:51; Tarnas 1996:63).This illustrates a 
contrast between the Hellenic conception of wisdom and that of the Jews which 
amounted to fearing God – according to the author of Ecclesiastes (or Wisdom of 
Solomon) (Armstrong 1999:84). The question is, “how did Yahweh become the God 
of Israel?” 
Mark S. Smith states (1990:156) – in his The Early History of God – that although 
cultural similarities between the Israelites and their Canaanite past as well as their 
contemporaneous neighbours were identifiable, it is difficult to clarify the causes. 
With that said, it is difficult to trace the development of Israelite monotheism back to 
“the point of ancient Israel’s historical appearance [circa 1200 BCE]” (Smith 
1990:156). The reasons may not be explicit but we can still follow the trend that 
shows ancient Israel moving away from a (limited) polytheism similar to that of its 
neighbours, to a religion that set them apart (Smith 1990:156). Armstrong (1999:68) 
paints a picture of a struggle, or rather a battle, for the primacy of Yahweh in the 
Middle East over against the pantheon of deities revered by a variety of nations. This 
process of “differentiation” resulted in the “displacement of Baal from Israel’s national 
cult” (Smith 1990:156). A notable example of the aforementioned process would be 
Josiah’s reform circa 623 BCE (Carr 2010:133). David M. Carr describes (2010:267) 
it as “a socio-religious reform that Josiah is said to have undertaken in the wake of 
the decline of Assyrian influence over the area (2 Kings 23; compare 2 Chronicles 
34), eliminating sanctuaries outside Jerusalem and laying claim to some of the 
territories of the former northern kingdom”. This is one example of the move from 
many gods to the one Judeo-Christian God, Yahweh, who revealed Himself to man 
through Moses, the prophets and Jesus Christ. 
This idea of revelation is expressed by Philo of Alexandria (25 BCE-50 CE), a 
Hellenistic Jewish philosopher. Philo states that God reveals Himself to and 
communicates with humanity using “powers” (Armstrong 1999:86). Two notable 
powers which God uses are Kingly (intelligible order of the universe) and Creative 
(blessing bestowed upon humanity) powers (Armstrong 1999:86). These powers are 
knowable and make God knowable to us; they emanate from His unknowable 
essential Being which Philo denotes as ousia (Armstrong 1999:86). According to 
Philo, we will never know God as He is in Himself, “He utterly transcends the mind”; 
we can only know God as He has chosen to reveal Himself to us (Armstrong 
1999:85-86). Beyond revelation, we may find that we venture into the realm of what 
Georg W.F. Hegel would term speculative [Spekulativ] philosophy (Inwood 
1992:272). 
My aim, then, is not to give a full account of God and all His characteristics. In actual 
fact, this is an insuperable task given the fact that such a comprehensive explanation 
is not even possible for our own terminable character. I daresay that we do not fully 
understand ourselves so as to give an exhaustive reflexive description; to assume 
our finitude can perceive the infinitude that is God, is folly. This, however, has not 
stopped man from speculating, even about an Absolute and the explanations thereof 
have never quite been adequate; there is a general consensus that human life 
consists of some essential transcendent element (Armstrong 1999:51, 116). 
What we see with religion and other human thought, is an attempt to articulate this 
general and widespread human experience of an Absolute. The means of this 
expression is language and consequently, it would be asinine not to afford – the 
Swiss linguist and semiotician – Ferdinand de Saussure a seat at this round table. 
De Saussure (1916:832) opposes the idea of language as merely a naming process 
– words simply corresponding to the things they are naming. He finds that this 
understanding presupposes that “ready-made ideas exist before words” and that the 
“linking of a name and a thing is a very simple process” (Saussure 1916:832). De 
Saussure (1916:832) then shows us that this approach can highlight something 
about the dual nature of the linguistic sign. The linguistic sign [signe] is an “intimately 
united” whole comprising of the signified [signifié] and the signifier [significant]; a 
signe carries the concept of something along with its sensory representation (as 
either sound or image which imply the concept as a whole) (Saussure 1916:833). 
The significant is therefore not empty; there exists a “natural bond” between it and 
the signifié (Saussure 1916:834). Humanity has articulated the transcendent and, in 
so doing, has produced a signe. The words and imagery (significant) humans have 
used and continue to use would be vacuous without a signifié. In fact, any discourse 
about a transcendent world would be meaningless without the referent. 
With the pronouncement of the death of God by Nietzcshe, however, we see an anti-
foundationalist removal of the signifié from thought, resulting in meaning being 
simply perspectival. This is one aspect of a secular postmodern society, a 
secularism that Armstrong (1999:4) describes as uncharted territory in Western 
history. Some may perceive this as a positive pioneering endeavour and that 
resorting to a transcendent signifié is a step backwards, however one cannot escape 
reality; a reality that has been experienced by humanity for millennia. Consequently, 
we see a return to spirituality in response to what Armstrong (1999:10) would call a 
“God-shaped hole”. 
Jeffery W. Robbins (ed. 2007:13, 15) speaks of a “transition from the death of God to 
postmodern faith”; “from secularism to postsecularism”, and quoting John D. Caputo, 
a move towards “religion without religion”. Celia Kourie (2006:75) illustrates this with 
a prevalent interest in spirituality in society whether it is “the concept and practice [of] 
Ubuntu”, utilisation of eastern meditation techniques and yoga. This can extend to 
and be seen with regards to feng shui architecture and interior design, employing 
acupuncture in medical practice and New Age spirituality espoused in popular 
culture such as Rhonda Byrne’s The Secret. 
My argument then, is to state that there exists a transcendence; one that I would 
describe as God. I do not hold to the notion that all religions lead to God in the sense 
of all roads leading to Rome. Alvin Plantinga’s use of the analogy of blind people 
each touching a certain part of an elephant (be it the tail, trunk, tusks, etc.) better 
describes my stance. No one person can claim a complete perception of the 
elephant but each describes what they experience in an attempt to understand more 
fully. The bottom line is that we are all experiencing the elephant, or rather, the 
Absolute that it represents. 
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